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Gender Bias Task Force:
Comments on Substantive Law Issues
Jane Marum Roush*
The Substantive Law Subcommittee of the Gender Bias Task Force
examined whether gender bias exists in areas of the substantive law of Vir-
ginia other than family or domestic relations law. The Subcommittee exam-
ined the following three principal areas: sexual assault laws,' stalking laws,2
and criminal sentencing.
The Subcommittee examined whether Virginia courts treat victims of
sexual assault with sensitivity, whether the complaints of victims of sexual
assault are taken seriously, and whether judges demonstrate an understanding
of the dynamics of sexual assault.' In general, attorneys who responded to the
surveys were overwhelmingly positive in their views of how Virginia's court
system handles sexual assault cases. For example, all of the public defenders
who responded reported that the courts "almost always" or "often" treat rape
cases seriously.5
Individuals who provide services to victims of sexual assault sounded a
discordant note. Contrary to the overall high marks given to Virginia's courts
by attorneys, these "sexual assault service providers" were generally negative
in their views of the courts' handling of sexual assault cases.6 For example,
sixty-four percent of these respondents thought that the courts "rarely" or
"almost never" understood the dynamics of sexual assault. Representatives
of the Task Force interviewed these sexual assault service providers to explore
their views further. The principal complaints of the sexual assault service
* Judge, 19th Judicial Circuit of Virginia, and Chair of the Substantive Law Sub-
committee of Virginia's Gender Bias Task Force.
1. GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS TASK FORCE, GENDER BIAS IN TBE COURTS OF THE
COMMONwEALT- FINAL REPORT 26-30 (2000) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (analyzing sexual
assault cases).
2. See id. at 64-67 (analyzing stalking cases).
3. See id. at 58-64 (analyzing sentencing cases).
4. See id. at 27-28 (discussing methodology for studying perception of bias in sexual
assault cases).
5. See id. at 197, app. D (delineating perception ofjudicial treatment of sexual assault
cases).
6. See id. at 28-29 (noting discrepancy between attorneys and service providers).
7. See id. at 197, app. D (delineating perception of judicial handling of sexual assault
cases).
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providers arose from prosecutors' interactions with victims of sexual assault.
These service providers cited the reluctance of prosecutors to prosecute cer-
tain cases, the willingness of prosecutors to accept plea bargains to greatly
reduced charges without consulting the victim, and the tendency of some
prosecutors to intimidate victims to accede to such plea bargains.8
To remedy some of these concerns, the Task Force recommended edu-
cation for prosecutors about the potential harm to victims of sexual assault
arising from the practice of plea bargaining for a guilty plea to a reduced
charge.9 In addition, the Task Force recommended the creation of local coord-
inating councils to increase the awareness of gender bias issues and discussion
of sexual assault issues among the various participants in the criminal justice
system who handle sexual assault cases."
The next area that the Subcommittee investigated was Virginia's stalking
laws." The focus of the study was to determine whether they adequately
protect victims of stalking.' 2 The Subcommittee initially considered stalking
to be an offense committed almost exclusively by men against women. The
Subcommittee learned, however, that women are often stalkers as well as the
victims of stalkers." In fact, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Lee County
reported that the majority of stalkers prosecuted by her office are women. In
the end, the inquiry was expanded to determine the adequacy of stalking laws
regardless of the gender of the victim.14
The Subcommittee concluded that Virginia's stalking statuteO ' was inade-
quate to protectvictims of stalking.' 6 In order to convict under that statute, the
defendant must be shown to have acted "with the intent to place, or with the
knowledge that the conduct places, [the victim] in reasonable fear of death,
criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to [the victim] or to [the victim's]
family or household member."'7 Virginia case law makes clear that the intent
8. Id. at29.
9. See id: at 31 (proposing recommendations).
10. Id.
11. For more information about stalking, see generally Carol E. Jordan et al., Stalking:
Cultural, Clinical andLegal Considerations, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 513 (2000) (discussing stalking
crimes); Amy C. Radosevich, Note, Thwarting the Stalker: AreAnti-StalkingMeasuresKeeping
Pace with Today's Stalker?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 219 (2000) (discussing efficacy of anti-
stalking laws); Belinda Wiggins, Note, Stalking Humans: Is There a Need for Federalization
ofAnti-Stalking Laws in Order to Prevent Recid'ivsm in Stalking, 50 SYRACUSE L. Rgv. 1067
(2000) (discussing inadequacy of state stalking laws); Nick Zimmerman, Attempted Stalking:
An Attempt-to-Almost-Attempt-to-Act, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 219 (2000) (discussing "attempted
stalking" in context of anti-stalking laws).
12. See FRNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-67 (analyzing stalking cases).
13. See id. at 65 (relaying study's findings regarding stalking).
14. See id. at 66-67 (addressing stalking laws).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1996) (amended by Va. House Bill No. 2112).
16. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 67 (outlining conclusions of stalking analysis).
17. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie 1996).
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needed for a conviction under the statute is the defendant's subjective intent,
not an objective standard of what a reasonable person would or should know."
The Subcommittee recommended strengthening the stalking law to follow
the Model Anti-Stalking Code for States. 9 This model code contains an
objective standard that the defendant "knew or should have known" that
reasonable fear would result from his or her conduct." I am pleased to tell you
that the 2000 Session of the Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia's
stalking statute in accordance withthe Task Force's recommendation." House
Bill 2112 amends Virginia Code § 18.2-60.3 to include the objective standard
that the defendant "knows or reasonably should know" that his or her conduct
puts the victim in fear.' In addition, the General Assembly passed House Bill
1710 which creates a civil cause of action for stalking and provides for both
compensatory and punitive damages.'
The last area that the Substantive Law Subcommittee investigated was
whether sentences differ for male and female offenders for the same offenses.24
This was one of the easiest areas to study because each judge in Virginia must
follow sentencing guidelines, and if a judge departs from those guidelines, he
or she must state the reasons why.' The Subcommittee studied sentences
given to men and women in Virginia in 1999 for the following five offenses:
prescription fraud, felony bad checks, drug distribution, unlawful wounding,
and malicious wounding.' The Task Force selected these offenses for study
because it was thought that both men and women committed them in sufficient
numbers to yield meaningful data.' The Subcommittee found no differences
in sentencing between male and female offenders who commit violent of-
fenses.' For some non-violent offenses, however, female offenders tend to
be sentenced more leniently.'
The Subcommittee hypothesized that the disparity between the sentences
for male and female non-violent offenders might be explained by a judicial
concern for a female offender's family responsibilities, such as care of young
18. See Bowen v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 20,22 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding
that Commonwealth's burden included proving defendant's subjective intent).
19. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 67 (stating recommendations).
20. See id. at 66 (describing Model Anti-Stalking Code for states).
21. Act of March 14, 2001, 2001 Va. Acts ch. 197 (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-60.3(A)).
22. Id.
23. Act of March 20, 2001, 2001 Va. Acts ch. 444 (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-42.3).
24. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 58-64 (analyzing sentencing cases).
25. See id. at 63 (discussing departures from sentencing guidelines).
26. See id. at 59 (discussing comparison analysis).
27. Id.
28. See &L at 60 (stating conclusions of comparison analysis).
29. Id.
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children. An examination of judges' stated reasons for departing downward
from voluntary sentencing guidelines, however, revealed that judges are not
citing a female offender's family responsibilities as a reason for sentencing a
non-violent female more leniently than her male counterpart
30
Other data examined by the Subcommittee suggested that a lack of sen-
tencing alternatives for women is a concern.31 For example, female offenders
sometimes opt for a determinate sentence in a local jail rather than enter a
diversionprogram. 2 Althoughthe diversionprogram offers drug treatment and
job training, it is frequently located in a distant city.33 Furthermore, the of-
fender is released from the diversion center and returned to her community only
when she completes certain goals rather than after a fixed period. 4 Presented
with such a choice, the female offender finds it difficult to arrange for childcare
without a pre-determined ending date.3 ' A fixed sentence in a local jail is often
preferable.36 As a result, the Subcommittee recommended that the Virginia
General Assembly consider funding for more alternative sentencing programs
for women located throughout Virginia near major metropolitan areas.37
The Subcommittee did identify one area of fairly explicit gender bias
in sentencing. Several jurisdictions in Virginia are participating in a pilot
project in which offenders who otherwise would be incarcerated are considered
instead for alternative dispositions based on an analysis of the offender's
likelihood of reoffending. 3' A "risk assessment" is conducted in which an
offender is scored based on factors historically predictive of recidivism. For
example, points are scored if the offender is young, never married, unem-
ployed, or acted alone in committing the offense.39 In addition, a point is
scored against the offender if he is male. 0 If enough points are scored against
the offender, he or she is not recommended for an alternative to incarceration.41
The Subcommittee recommended that the Virginia Sentencing Commission
should consider eliminating the "male point" from the risk assessment if the
pilot program is expanded statewide. 2
30. See id. at 63 (discussing reasons for departing from sentencing guidelines).




35. Id. at 62-63.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 64 (listing recommendations).
38. See id. at 60-61 (discussing pilot project).
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 64 (listing recommendations).
